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ure we are now considering. I believe a base plan of the type I suggested would have been an effective instrument in reducing surpluses, and as it did so, it would reward those dairy farmers who had reduced their production. There is no logic whatsoever in encouraging the production of \$3 milk in an area where producers need \$5 to \$6 to cover the cost of producing milk.

However, it soon became apparent during the hearings that my bill was too severe for any serious consideration. There was too much active opposition to it by major segments of the industry. As a matter of fact, even after the Department of Agriculture proposed less stringent language it was still thought too severe by some.

Be that as it may, the fact remains that my bill was unacceptable.

In its place, however, we have a bill, S. 1915, which I believe will be helpful, over a period of years, in reducing production in market order areas. As a result we anticipate that there will be some savings to the taxpayer, and at the same time a slight increase in income to farmers.

I am a realist, therefore, I have given up hope on my bill. Instead, I support S. 1915, the measure now before the Senate, because it will accomplish some good.

Mr. PROXIMIRE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART in the chair). Without objection, it is ordered.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator from Minnesota for yielding to me.

#### SEPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS IN THE CIA

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the assessment of intelligence and the carrying out of covert or paramilitary operational activities are two very different functions. These days we often hear the words "conflict of interest." But, if there was ever a conflict of interest, it is when the same group of men, first, collect intelligence and make an assessment of the intelligence they have collected and coordinated, and then, secondly, proceed to carry out an operation on the basis of the selfsame intelligence they have collected and assessed. The temptation to trim the intelligence or, at least, their assessment of it, to suit the operation is well nigh irresistible.

An excellent example of the tragic results that can result from the failure to separate the assessment of intelligence from operational activities was demonstrated at the Bay of Pigs 2 1/2 years ago.

If one result was drawn, if one lesson was learned, from that affair, it was that the responsibility for intelligence collection and assessment must be separated from the responsibility for carrying out operational activities.

I remember being among the small group of public officials who publicly took a stand prior to the Bay of Pigs, warning that an invasion would be unlikely of success since the majority of the Cuban people at that time favored the regime, a conclusion derived from my own visit to Cuba following my election in 1960 and a conclusion which I announced publicly after my return. After the Bay of Pigs, a board was set up and the general impression was that there would be drastic overhauls in our Central Intelligence Agency, including a separation of responsibility between those who gather and assess intelligence as opposed to those who carry out operational activities.

In fact, not only does the centralization of responsibility for the gathering and assessment of intelligence and the carrying out of subsequent operations rest under the same roof here in Washington, but the chiefs of station in the field appear to be carrying on these dual and conflicting responsibilities.

In this connection, too, we all recall President Kennedy's instruction to our Government personnel abroad on May 29, 1961, when he said that only the American Ambassador should be responsible for all American Government activities abroad. The President instructed that each Ambassador be fully informed about the activities of all agencies of the American Government in the country to which he is assigned. Yet, I must say that the Ambassador who is both completely at ease and fully informed about all the activities conducted by American Government people in the area of his assignment and aware of all the messages home is indeed a rare bird.

I fully realize that the Central Intelligence Agency is in general run and manned by remarkably brilliant, dedicated, and responsible individuals and that it has scored many successes. I also realize that, being an intelligence organization, the Central Intelligence Agency is in the defenseless position of being attacked for its public failures but unable to discuss freely its successes.

The question where there is doubt in my mind is whether the total number of successes outweigh the total number of failures; whether our American national interest in totality has been helped or hampered by the Central Intelligence Agency. And, when this determination is made, I believe we must separate the intelligence and assessment functions from the operational functions.

My own personal view is that a complete, fair assessment would show that the United States would have, on balance, gained greatly as the result of its intelligence collection and assessment activities. But I also believe that, on balance, the U.S. national interest may well have lost more than it has gained from its CIA operational activities, particularly if one takes into account the lives and

the dollars that have been lost in the carrying out of these activities. And I believe that an objective appraisal will show that when decisions to carry out operational activities have gone sour, the reason for clouded judgments has simply been that the same group assesses the intelligence and then proceeds to carry out the operation.

Actually, in South Vietnam, where, as the public press has set forth, we have had an excellent and very able Central Intelligence Agency chief of station. We might find ourselves in a better position if there were a greater separation between collecting and assessing of intelligence on the one hand and the carrying out of the subsequent operations on the other. We might not then be playing quite the same role we now do where the United States is helping finance and force, which carry out the persecution, beating up, and abuse of political opponents. I do hope that, in order to improve our situation in South Vietnam and throughout the world, the administration will make more positive steps to separate the responsibilities for the gathering and assessment of intelligence from the carrying out of subsequent operational activities.

In this connection, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record at this point a well thought-out editorial from Tuesday's Washington Post illustrating the necessity of such a separation.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### Our Man in Saigon

The recall of the CIA chief in South Vietnam should not be an occasion for reprimand. It should be an occasion for some useful reconsideration of the general role of an intelligence agency in foreign affairs. Ambassador Lodge is reportedly concerned about the prevailing arrangement that makes the CIA both an intelligence-gathering organization and an operational agency in the field. Mr. Lodge is not alone in his concern.

In theory, within the CIA, the intelligence and operational activities are kept separate. In practice, the two functions cannot be kept apart so easily: experience has shown that agency operatives in the field have a tendency to use intelligence to support an operational decision. The result, too often, is that Washington receives neither impartial intelligence nor benefits from operations based on a hard-headed perception of reality.

Clearly the CIA is at a disadvantage in any public debate of its activities: the agency cannot speak for itself. Success often goes unnoticed; failure just as often may lead to an exaggeration of the CIA's responsibility. This is the price that secrecy exacts. But public concern in the agency's performance is legitimate and should not be equated with an attempt to censure or to impeach the motives of any CIA official.

What is sorely needed is a thorough and fair overall study of the intelligence community. Such an inquiry ought to deal with rivalry between the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. It ought to draw on experience in other countries where intelligence and operational activities are lodged with separate organizational entities. And Congress should take the initiative in launching such a study.

For too many years, Members of Congress have closed their eyes to the need for legis-